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We should learn from the Court’s decision in Dolan City o f Tigard this 
Term whether the current Court is willing to continue down the Takings Clause path 
first charted out by Justice Scalia in his opinion for the Court in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). There are only five Justices now on the 
Court who were sitting on the bench at the time Nollan was decided — three from the 
majority and two from the dissent -- and while the Court is generally more 
conservative in 1994 than it was in 1987, it is far from clear whether Nollan will be 
reaffirmed and expanded or, instead, sharply limited. The most interesting issue in 
the case concerns the extent to which the Court accepts the plaintiff’s claim that the 
Takings Clause requires government to demonstrate a fairly close fit between the 
conditions the government would like to place on resource development and the 
actual, proven impacts of that development. Such permit conditions and exactions are 
a regular feature of government regulation in environmental and natural resource law.
The record in the case supporting the City’s permit conditions is much 
stronger than the Court likely realized at the time that the Court granted certiorari, 
which makes affirmance of the state supreme court’s rejection of the takings challenge 
possible, notwithstanding that the Court likely granted review expecting to reverse.
At oral argument, however, several of the "swing" Justices still seemed somewhat 
skeptical of the fairness of the conditions and concerned about the possibility that the
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plaintiff may have been singled out because of the City’s desire for easements on her 
property rather than because of the City’s general concern with flood hazards and 
traffic congestion.
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II. NOLAN TO DOLAN:PERMIT CONDITIONS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
A. Why Permit Conditions/Exactions Are So Important To Regulators And
The Potential For Their Abuse In Environmental And Natural Resources
Law
Permit conditions and exactions are frequently the rule rather than the 
exception in environmental and natural resource law. Whether by statute or by 
regulation, centralized government tends to restrict private property rights in natural 
resources based on generalizations and rough categories. By contrast, the natural 
environment that is the object of these restrictions tends to resist easy application of 
the generalizations underlying those laws. Permit conditions and exactions provide a 
means for more finely tuning the regulatory process and for achieving a better 
accommodation between competing private and public interests in natural resource 
development, conservation, and preservation.
B. Why The Takings Clause Applies To Permit Conditions;
California Coastal Commission. 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
While providing a means for fine tuning and accommodation, the permit 
condition process also invites the potential for government abuse and overreaching. 
Most simply put, government can use the threat of police power restrictions to exact 
transfers of wealth from private parties to the government. To prevent government 
from misusing its police power authority in this fashion, the Supreme Court in Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), held that the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause limited the grounds on which government could decide to 
lift an otherwise permissible police power restriction. At issue in the case was a 
police power restriction on the height of residences along the California coast, which 
the California Coastal Commission agreed to lift in exchange for the homeowner 
agreeing to provide the public with an easement of lateral access along the beach in 
front of the house. The Court held that the permit condition amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking because the objectives served by the permit condition did not 
bear sufficient relation to the ends served by the police power restriction being lifted 
by that condition.
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The Court’s holding that the Takings Clause, rather than simply the Due 
Process Clause, limits the permissible scope of permit conditions and exactions is not 
irresistible, which is also why the case is significant. Left unsettled post-Nollan is 
whether the Court intends to invoke the Takings Clause to limit permit conditions 
other than the kind of easement at issue in Nollan, which implicated the Court’s 
traditional Takings Clause concern with physical invasions. The Nollan majority also 
strongly intimated that the Takings Clause required a tighter means/ends fit — 
substantially advancing — than the "reasonable relationship" traditionally required in 
Due Process analysis. Finally, the Nollan Court raised, but did not decide, how 
closely related the permit condition must be to the restriction being lifted. The Court 
did not have to reach the issue, having concluded that there was no relationship at all 
in Nollan.
C. Why The Supreme Court Granted Review In Dolan v. City O f Tigard, S.
Ct. No, 93-518 (pending)
The most likely reason that at least four Justices voted to grant review in 
Dolan was to reaffirm and underscore the Court’s ruling in Nollan. The impact of 
Nollan in lower court litigation had been modest, at best. The petition for certiorari 
in Dolan, coupled with a strong dissent in the Oregon Supreme Court, created the 
distinct impression that the Oregon Supreme Court had given mere lip service to 
Nollan, and had required the challenged state law to do no more than pass muster 
under a mere "rational basis" standard. The dissent also strongly suggested that the 
permit condition at issue in that case — which, as in Nollan, involved easements and 
public access -- was both wholly out of proportion to the character and degree of the 
government’s legitimate interests in the plaintiff’s proposed development and nothing 
more than an attempt by the City to obtain public parkland without paying just 
compensation to the landowner.
In Dolan, the plaintiff sought a permit to double the size of an existing 
hardware and plumbing store on a downtown lot in Tigard, Oregon. The lot is
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adjacent to a creek that had flooded portions of the downtown in the past, and the 
City had previously designated part of the lot a floodplain and restricted development 
on that portion. Pursuant to City ordinance, the landowner’s proposed development — 
which did not involve constructing any portion of the building within the floodplain 
designation — amounted to a "major development," requiring a City permit. The City 
agreed to issue the necessary permit, but only upon the landowner agreeing to 
dedicate two separate easements to the City: (1) an easement near the creek, on 
which the City would construct a drainage ditch; and (2) an easement on which the 
City would construct a bicycle/pedestrian pathway. The City asserted that the 
drainage easement was necessary because the proposed development would increase 
the amount of impervious surface area, thereby increasing flood risks, and that the 
pathway was necessary to alleviate existing traffic congestion problems that the 
proposed development would exacerbate. The City subsequently denied plaintiff’s 
request for a variance from these restrictions.
III. THE STAKES IN DOLAN: WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN THE COURT’S
OPINION -  W HITHER NOLLAN
Only five of the nine justices who originally decided Nollan are still on the Court: 
three from the majority (Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia) and two from the dissent 
(Blackmun and Stevens). This case therefore provides the opportunity to see whether the 
current Court is interested in accepting Nollan apparent invitation to subject land use 
regulations to heightened judicial Takings Clause scrutiny or is instead now ready to limit the 
Nollan ruling. The Court’s perspective on Nollan can be gleaned from its treatment of a 
variety of issues, described below.
A. Due Process Or Takings
Although the City, the United States, and most of the other amici supporting 
the City shied away from suggesting to the Court that the Due Process Clause, rather 
than the Takings Clause, should govern these issues, it is possible that the Court 
might revisit Nollan’s  premise. But unlikely. Certainly the oral argument offered no 
hint of that occurring.
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B. Presumptions. Burdens Of Proof, And Variance Procedures
Much of Dolan turns on who has the burden of proof to demonstrate what, 
when. The Court has long asserted that legislation is entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality, but has left fairly muddled precisely how that presumption operates 
in a takings case. For instance, what is the significance of that presumption in terms 
of the initial showing that a property owner must make in order to place the onus 
back on the government to justify its action. The burden issue was a source of some 
dispute between the majority and dissent in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), and promises to be so again in Dolan, because of the 
uncertainty inevitably surrounding the impacts that the plaintiff’s proposed 
development would actually have on flood hazards and traffic congestion. There is 
also necessarily uncertainty surrounding the extent to which the City’s conditions will 
redress those impacts. Further complicating the inquiry in Dolan (likely in the City’s 
favor) was the existence of a variance procedure that the plaintiff pursued, but without 
trying to refute the City’s assumptions regarding the development’s impact.
C. Levels Of Scrutiny: "Specifically And Uniquely Attributable,"
"Substantially Related," "Reasonably Related." "Rationally Related." and
"Wholly Out Of Proportion"
The most significant part of the Court’s ruling is likely to be how the Court 
characterizes the relationship that the Takings Clause requires between the permit 
condition and the police power restriction being lifted and, even more importantly, the 
degree to which the permit condition must be proportional to the burdens of the 
proposed development. For instance, to what extent must the City demonstrate the 
precise amount of flood hazards attributable to the plaintiff’s proposed development 
and to what extent must the burdens imposed by the drainage easement be somehow 
considered proportional to those incremental hazards. Likewise, to what extent must 
the City demonstrate the impact on traffic congestion of the plaintiff’s proposed 
development and to what extent must the burdens imposed by the easement for the 
bicycle/pedestrian be proportional to that impact. (Must, for instance, the pathway be
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intended to serve the transportation needs of the plaintiff’s store or is it sufficient that 
the pathway will generally reduce traffic congestion).
In Nollan, the Court addressed only the first matter — the relationship between 
the initial police power restriction and the permit condition -- and concluded that there 
had to be some relationship without characterizing what the relationship must be. The 
Court did not address the second issue directly, because, having found no 
relationship, the Court did not have to define what the relationship must be. But the 
Court nonetheless strongly intimated that the Takings Clause required some 
proportionality inquiry. While the City and the plaintiff in this case sharply disagree 
on the question of what relationship the record establishes -- with the City claiming 
that it can, but should not have to, meet a heightened standard — much of their 
respective briefs, and those of their supporting amici, focus on the proper 
characterization of the relationship test.
C. Fairness And Subterfuge
The Court’s primary concern in Nollan, which will not disappear in Dolan is 
the possibility of government using police power restrictions and permit conditions to 
single out some property owners for excessive burdens. At oral argument in Dolan, 
several of the Justices were plainly concerned about the possibility that the plaintiff 
had been unfairly singled out. In particular, they were concerned that the City might 
not be requiring other developers to mitigate the flood hazard and traffic impacts of 
their development and had simply singled out those property owners, like Dolan, who 
happened to own property in an area where the government sought easements to 
further the City’s desire to have green ways and a bicycle/pedestrian pathway.
Whether the City persuaded the Justices that the plaintiff was not being singled out 
and that developers elsewhere had to abide by comparable (not identical) permit 
conditions is likely to be critical to the City’s chances of obtaining a favorable ruling.
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D. The Finer Points
1. Accounting for the Benefits of Regulation in Considering the 
Constitutionality of Its Burdens
Government lawyers have long argued that courts should not 
consider the burdens of regulations without simultaneously taking into 
consideration the benefits the regulation confer on private property. And 
there is some support in the case law for doing so. In Dolan, government 
lawyers (for both the City and the United States as amicus curiae) placed 
heavy emphasis on the disproportional benefits that the plaintiff would 
receive from the permit conditions, because of the proximity of her 
property to the creek and the commercial advantages to her business of 
reduced traffic congestion. At the oral argument, however, the Justices 
seemed divided regarding the significance of the benefit inquiry.
2. Distinguishing Between Governmental Objectives: Public Safety 
(Floodplains and Traffic Congestion) vs. Public Welfare (Bike Paths 
and Greenwavs)
Some lawyers involved in the case thought that the record 
supporting the easement condition for the drainage ditch was stronger than 
the record in favor of the easement for the bicycle/pedestrian pathway, 
partly because the Court might be more sympathetic to the purposes served 
by the former. Others thought, for similar reasons, that the greenway 
aspects of the City’s plan were the most vulnerable. At oral argument, 
some of the Justices (including Kennedy) appeared interested in 
distinguishing between the two easements and the City’s various objectives.
3. Assessing Expectations: Downtown Commercial vs. Residential 
Property
This case is potentially distinguishable from Nollan, by analogy to 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), on the theory that 
easements are less disruptive of the property owner’s expectations when the
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property at issue is downtown commercial property (as in PruneYard) rather 
than residential property (as in Nollan).
4. Allowing for Thresholds and Cumulative Impacts
The kind of strict proportionality analysis sought by the plaintiff in this 
case, if adopted by the Court, could limit government’s ability to redress 
cumulative impacts, which are, by definition, not readily attributable to any 
one isolable regulated activity. It could also limit the government’s ability to 
use "rules of thumb" and thresholds in devising police power regulations and 
permit conditions. These issues were themes within the briefs filed by the 
City and the United States.
III. SUPREME SPECULATION: COUNTING THE POSSIBLE VOTES (FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT)
A. The Nollan Dissenters:Relying on Stevens and Blackmun
B. The New Voices on the Court
1. Hoping for Souter and Ginsburg
2. Reaching for Kennedy
C. The Nollan Majority (minus 2 (Powell and White), plus 1 (Thomas))
1. Concerned About O’Connor
2. Dreaming of Rehnquist
3. Scalia (and Thomas) NOT!
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